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Issues in Past Performance Evaluation









• Only 31% of contract actions requiring CPARS reporting had 
completed reports (GAO,2009)
• Insufficient information to support ratings (OFPP, 2011)
•how the contractor met, exceeded, or failed to meet 
requirements
• Incomplete reports – some categories not rated
• “Halo Effect” - Raters often inflate ratings to avoid conflict 
with the contractor (GAO, 2009)
• PP increasingly subject to Contract Disputes Act
• Much attention and some improvement recently
• Fed Gov’t PP Guide (2012), formerly DoD Guide (2011)
Issues in Past 
Performance Evaluation
• Degree of inaccuracy of PPI unknown 
• Inaccurate PP assessments can harm contractors’ 
reputations 
• Can bias source selections resulting in adverse 
selection.
• Reasons for inaccuracy not empirically explored
• Transaction costs not insignificant – but unknown precisely
•If PPI is not reliable, and if evaluators cannot use the 
PPI to discriminate between proposals (Kelman, 2010), 
the effort of collecting and reporting, then later evaluating 
and documenting PPI  is squandered
• Federal contract managers are overworked (GAO, 
2009) and understaffed (GAO, 2001)
• Awarded 5.9M contract actions at $538B in FY10 
• PP evals, thus, often add little value to selection decisions
Problems
Purpose:  Explore the efficacy of the government’s current 
use of PPI 
• Validate reported issues
• Tee up future research
Research Questions:
• Are PP reports useful?  
• Motivate suppliers to perform?
• Reduce future performance uncertainty?
• To what extent do PP evaluations/ratings influence 
source selection decisions?
• Why do PP evaluations/ratings lack sufficient justification?
• Why are PP evaluations sometimes inaccurate?
• In the cases of multiple evaluators on a single contract 
action, do PP evaluations/ratings deviate among evaluators, 
and, if so, why?
• Why do reviewing officials change the ratings of the 
evaluator (assessing official)?
Purpose & Research 
Question
Agency Theory – 2 problems: 
1. conflicting interests between principal and agent and
2. difficulty and cost associated with monitoring agents, and 
the associated uncertainty for not having perfect 
information (Eisenhardt, 1989).
• Supplier as agent to buyer
• Evaluator and other stakeholders as agents to buyer
• Allegiance to buyer, program, or ktr (fairness; effect 
on ktr)?
Organizational Behavior




• Formal Comm decr distortion (Mohr & Sohi, 1995)
Theoretical 
Frameworks
Qualitative – appropriate when:
1. research is exploratory in nature 
(“why?”)
2. researcher has no control of the 
behavioral events being researched




• 38-67 Min; avg 18 pages transcribed
Methodology
























































































































































































































































• On average, past performance evaluations 
consume nearly 38 man-hrs of effort (rng 8-100).
• Leaders should ensure evaluators have sufficient 
time to perform their PP evals
• Manning models need to account for PP 
workload
• Thoroughly define requirements—including 
measurements of success and precise definitions of 
CPAR ratings tailored to the requirement—prior to 
solicitation
• PP reporting is often not a sufficient surrogate for 
contractor performance management.
• More frequent, formal, and two-way 
communication appears necessary to ensure 
rating accuracy
Implications
•Leaders should mitigate turnover of performance 
evaluators
• Independent agency requirements ombudsman to 
ensure sufficient definitions of rqmts and PP ratings
• Halo effect confirmed – due to fear of dispute, 
fairness, protecting program, and concern for effect 
on ktr – particularly whether one instance of perf
failure should represent all other successful perf
opportunities
• Some use PP as leverage – as a threat ex ante, or 
as punishment ex post
• Lots of variance in performance info collection, 
recording, and sharing
• Consider SPE system
Implications (cont.)
• Confirmed many reported weaknesses
• Explained why the systemic weaknesses occur:
•Accuracy of performance info,
•Workload, 
•Variance in communications, 
•Poor rating justifications, 
•Variance in performance info collection, 
reporting, and sharing
• But, need to quantitatively confirm findings with a 
large sample
• Future research could explore effects of low PP 
efficacy on the contractor:
•Performance?
•Relationship quality?
Conclusion
